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Abstract
This paper addresses a puzzle related to firm size and competition. Since Stephen Hymer´s
pioneering contribution (Hymer, 1960/1976),  theories of the firm implicitly assume that
only large, diversified multinational enterprises can compete in industries that combine high
capital intensity, high knowledge-intensity and a high degree of internationalization. Small
firms, by definition, have limited resources and capabilities and are unlikely to possess
substantial ownership advantages.  They also have a limited capacity to influence and shape
the development of markets, market structure and technological change.  One would thus
expect that they are ill-equipped to compete in a knowledge-intensive  industry that is highly
globalized.
Taiwan’s experience in the computer industry tells a different story: despite the dominance
of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),  Taiwan successfully competes in the
international market for PC-related products, key components and knowledge-intensive
services. The paper inquires into how this was possible. It is argued that organizational
innovations related to the creation of knowledge are of critical importance. Taiwanese
computer firms were able to develop their own distinctive approach: due to their initially
very narrow knowledge base, access to external sources of knowledge has been an essential
prerequisite for their knowledge creation. Such “inter-organizational knowledge creation”
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) was facilitated by two factors: active, yet selective and
continuously adjusted industrial development policies; and a variety of linkages with large
Taiwanese business groups, foreign sales and manufacturing affiliates and an early
participation in international production networks established by foreign electronics
companies.
A novel contribution of this paper is its focus on inter-organizational knowledge creation. I
first describe Taiwan´s achievements in the computer industry. The dominance of SMEs and
their role as a source of flexibility is documented in part II. Part III describes some policy
innovations that have shaped the process of knowledge creation. The rest of the paper
inquires how inter-organizational knowledge creation has benefited from a variety of
linkages with large domestic and foreign firms; I also address some industrial upgrading
requirements that result from this peculiar type of knowledge creation.
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9It would seem self-evident that small companies would not be competitive in a knowledge-
intensive industry that is highly globalized.1  Small firms, by definition, have limited
resources and capabilities and are unlikely to possess substantial ownership advantages.
They also have a limited capacity to influence and shape the development of markets,
market structure and technological change.  One would thus expect SMEs to be ill-equipped
to compete in an industry that requires a broad range of fairly demanding technological and
organizational capabilities.
The disadvantages of small size for firms are compounded if they come from small
countries. Small nations are confronted with four types of size-related disadvantages2 : i)
The small domestic market places tight restrictions on the ability to function as a buffer
against heavy fluctuations in international demand. ii) It constrains the development of
sophisticated “lead users”3 that could stimulate innovation. iii) It also limits the scope for
technological spill-overs4. And iv) the limited size of the national knowledge and capital
base restricts the choice of industries in which such small nations might successfully
specialize.
Taiwan’s experience however tells a different story: SMEs have been the main carriers of its
rapid development.  Despite the dominance of SMEs, Taiwan today has the most broadly
based computer industry in Asia outside of Japan.  The country has diversified beyond core
PC-related products into a variety of related high growth market segments; it has improved
its domestic production capabilities for a number of high value-added components; and it
has been able to move beyond manufacturing, into a range of higher-end, knowledge-
intensive support services.
This paper inquires into how this was possible. Its message can be summarized by
paraphrasing John Stopford: “innovations in strategy and organization can change the ‘rules
                                                
1
 Since Stephen Hymer´s pioneering contribution in 1960 (Hymer, 1976),  theories of the firm implicitly
assume that only large, diversified multinational enterprises can compete in industries that combine high
capital intensity, high knowledge-intensity and a high degree of internationalization. For concise statements
of this consensus position, see Caves, 1982; the last chapter in Chandler, 1990, and  Dunning, 1993.
2
 Important contributions are Walsh, 1987;  Freeman and Lundvall (eds.), 1988; and Maskell, 1996a.
3
 Von Hippel defines “lead users of a novel or enhanced product, process, or service” as those that “...face
needs that will be general in the market place, but...(who) face them months or years before the bulk of that
marketplace encounters them...” and who will “... benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those
needs.” (Von Hippel, 1988, p.107)
4
 Technological spill-overs are assumed to be mainly domestically generated by innovation theorists (Lundvall,
1992 and Nelson, 1993) as well as by “new growth” theorists (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and 1993). If
this is so, then large countries will benefit more from an investment in R&D than smaller countries, where
some of the spill-overs of R&D are likely to benefit its trading partners. (Zander and Kogut, 1995)
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of competition’ and overturn many scale advantages to permit David to defeat Goliath.”5 Of
critical importance are organizational innovations related to the creation of knowledge6.
Taiwanese computer firms were able to develop their own distinctive approach: due to their
initially very narrow knowledge base, access to external sources of knowledge has been an
essential prerequisite for their knowledge creation. Such “inter-organizational knowledge
creation” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 89) was facilitated by two factors: active, yet
selective and continuously adjusted industrial development policies; and a variety of
linkages with large firms, both domestic and foreign.  I show how government policies
facilitated the initial market entry of SMEs and were adjusted over time to promote
continual upgrading and knowledge creation.  Industrial development policies on their own,
however, are insufficient to explain Taiwan’s success7.  Taiwanese computer companies
also benefited from a variety of linkages that have facilitated their learning and capability
formation.  These include strong ties with large Taiwanese business groups, foreign sales
and manufacturing affiliates and an early participation in international production networks
established by foreign electronics companies.
A novel contribution of this paper is its focus on inter-organizational knowledge creation8.
This reflects the findings of a rich body of research on technological learning in developing
countries: successful late industrialization critically depends on the external sourcing of
knowledge and on the reverse sequencing of capability formation9. The paper is organized
as follows: I first describe Taiwan´s achievements in the computer industry. The dominance
of SMEs and their role as a source of flexibility is documented in part II. Part III describes
some policy innovations that have shaped the process of knowledge creation. The rest of the
paper (IV-VI) inquires how inter-organizational knowledge creation has benefited from a
variety of linkages with large domestic and foreign firms; I also address some industrial
upgrading requirements that result from this peculiar type of knowledge creation.
                                                
5
 Stopford, 1996
6
 This is in line with the evolutionary, resource-based theory of the firm which argues that , competition today
centers around a firm's ability to build capabilities quicker and at less cost than its competitors. (See Penrose
1959/1995; Richardson 1960/1990; Richardson, 1996; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1993;
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; and Foss and Knudsen, 1996.
7
 This is where I differ from Robert Wade´s otherwise extremely stimulating analysis (Wade, 1990)
8
 Nonaka and Takeuchi´s seminal work (1995) has focused primarily on intra-firm knowledge creation. It is
time to complement this analysis with empirical research on inter-organizational knowledge creation. For a
similar agenda, see Lam, 1997.
9
 Dahlman, Ross-Larson and Westphal, 1997; Lall, 1990; Ernst and O´Connor, 1989; Bell and Pavitt, 1993;
Kim Linsu 1997; Ernst and Lundvall, 1997; and Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1997.
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I. Taiwan’s achievements: a broad range of capabilities
Over the last decade, Taiwan has established itself as a world-class supply source for a
variety of electronic hardware products.  It is the world's largest supplier of computer
monitors, motherboards, switching power supplies, mouse devices, keyboards, scanners and
a variety of add-on cards.  In 1996, almost 60 percent of the world’s desktop PCs were either
made in Taiwan or contained a motherboard made by a Taiwanese company.10  Since 1994,
Taiwan also has become the world's largest manufacturer of notebook PCs.  Most of these
computers are sold to American and Japanese computer companies which re-sell them under
their own logo, but 70 percent of the computers sold under such OEM arrangements have
been designed by Taiwanese companies. Taiwanese computer firms have clearly developed
significant design capabilities.
Progress has been equally impressive in the field of electronic components.  Taiwan today
has hundreds of passive component makers that have established a strong position relative to
leading Japanese and US competitors.  Taiwanese firms have also improved their position in
the capital-intensive mass production of precision components, such as large-scale CRT
picture tubes for computer monitors and sophisticated display devices (like active -matrix
TFT-LCDs) for laptop computers.  The same is true for integrated circuits.  While Taiwan's
semiconductor industry at present accounts for hardly more than 3 percent of the world
market, some of its firms have developed a strong position for a number of higher value-
added IC devices, like chip sets, static RAM memories, mask ROMs, and EPROMs.  In
addition, Taiwan today has one of the world's leading silicon foundry companies, TSMC,
that is able to produce leading-edge ICs on very short production cycles both for major
international semiconductor firms and smaller design firms. Overall, Taiwanese
semiconductor producers have a much better balanced product portfolio that the Korean
chaebol which are heavily reliant on the highly volatile DRAM market segment. As a result,
Taiwanese producers today are less exposed to high debt and falling equity prices than their
Korean counterparts (Ernst, 1997c).
Two recent structural changes show how Taiwanese firms have upgraded their capabilities:
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 Asia IT Report, January 1997, p.3
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a rapid diversification beyond hard core PC-related products; and a shift from stand-alone
manufacturing services to integrated service packages that cover a wide range of value chain
activities, including higher value-added support services.  Taiwanese computer companies
now have established themselves as competitive suppliers in a variety of complementary,
high-growth market segments, some of which display considerably higher profit margins.
Such diversification is evident in three areas: the development of so-called PC network
products,11 especially modems and network interface cards; multimedia accessories, such as
CD-ROM drives and add-on cards, and a variety of information services industries, such as
multimedia software, system integration, turnkey systems, and network services.  Most of
these information services owe their existence to the convergence of previously separated
technologies used for computing, communicating and digital consumer applications, and
require the capacity to combine various strands of technology to generate new applications
and markets.
Taiwanese firms have also developed a capacity to provide a package of services across a
wide range of value chain activities, sustaining their position as preferred OEM suppliers to
the industry.  With the exception of R&D and marketing, practically all other stages of the
value chain can now be performed by Taiwan’s OEM contractors.  Moreover, Taiwanese
firms are beginning to shoulder essential coordination functions.
Three characteristic examples of these processes of diversification and the provision of
integrated service capabilities are scanners, computer monitors, and turnkey production
arrangements. Scanner production demands optical, mechanical and electronic technologies
and capabilities.  Taiwan has accumulated expertise in all three, and has become the world’s
largest supplier of scanners.  With a firm grip on all stages of the value chain, from R&D
and production to marketing and after-sales service, Taiwan is positioned to defend its
leadership position as a “one-stop shopping center” for scanners.
Since 1993, Taiwan has been the world’s largest producer of monitors.  Monitor production
is highly sensitive to scale economies.  Not surprisingly, Taiwan is now faced with intense
competition from Korean chaebol which are clearly superior in terms of standard mass
production.  Some firms have tried to establish themselves as suppliers of higher-end and
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 “PC network products” are defined as “products that are used for LANs (Local Area Networks), PSTN
(Public Switched Tellephone Network), ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), ASDL (Asymmetric
Digital Subscriber Loop) and cable modems. Main products include  “network interface cards, hubs, bridging
switches, modems and routers.” Definitions are taken from: Electronic Computer Glossary. Add-on cards
include sound, video and graphics cards. Of these, video cards display higher-than-average profit margins.
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environmentally friendly monitors, with limited success.  Much more successful has been a
second response: to move beyond manufacturing to the supply of integrated service
packages.  Taiwanese monitor producers are now able to provide their leading OEM
customers with global manufacturing and sales support more rapidly than the slow-moving
Korean chaebol.  This shift to global support service packages has been driven by external
developments, particularly IBM’s  decision in 1996 to pull out of monitor production and to
transfer large orders to two leading Taiwan-based monitor producers.  In order to accelerate
speed-to-market, IBM requested that Taiwanese suppliers directly ship the monitors to the
relevant markets and that they also provide a complex package of local support services that
cover sales, distribution and after-sales services.
A third example is the spread of "turnkey production arrangements" in the PC industry.  In a
recent contract with Taiwan's Mitac International, Compaq has out-sourced all stages of the
value chain except marketing: Mitac is responsible for the design and development of new
products, as well as for manufacturing, transport and after-sales services at its manufacturing
facilities in Taiwan, China, Britain, Australia and the US. For Compaq, Mitac's greatest
attraction is its network of plants and sales subsidiaries located in most of the world's key
computer markets.
Taiwan’s achievements would be impressive for any country; they are even more impressive
for a small island, about one-third the size of New York State.  With a population of about
21 million people, roughly half the size of South Korea, Taiwan lacked a large and
sophisticated domestic market, specialized capabilities and support industries, and the
science and technology infrastructure necessary for developing a broad set of electronics
products.  From the outset, Taiwan’s PC industry depended heavily on international markets
and access to foreign technology.  Penetrating foreign markets and absorbing imported
technology is not automatic, however; it requires conscious efforts to develop a variety of
domestic resources and capabilities through deliberate knowledge creation management12.
How do small enterprises develop such capabilities?
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 There is a rich body of research, based on the assumptions of evolutionary economics, that specifies what
type of capabilities are required and how the development of such capabilities affects firm organization.In
addition to the references in note 6, see Lundvall, 1988 and 1992; Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Teece,
Pisano and Shuen, 1995; Christensen, 1996; Foray and Lundvall, 1996; Foss, 1996; Llerena and Zuscovitch,
1996; and  Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996.  For an application of this theoretical approach to research on
developing countries, see Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1997, and Ernst and Lundvall, 1997. Much of the
literature  on firm capabilities however focuses on large multi-divisional corporations and fails to discuss
how small enterprises can develop such capabilities. Exceptions are Acs and Audretsch, 1992; and  Maskell
1996 a and 1996b.
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II. The dominance of SMEs: a source of flexibility
Small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been the main carriers of Taiwan’s rapid
development and remain important today.  In 1993, SMEs accounted for 96 percent of the
total number of companies, 69 percent of total employment and 55 percent of Taiwan’s
manufactured exports.13  Taiwan today is home to more than 4,000 electronics firms that
produce a broad mix of PC-related products and electronic components.  With a few
exceptions like the Tatung group, almost all of these companies started out as small
enterprises.
The role of SMEs as engines of growth and industrial transformation sets Taiwan apart from
South Korea, where huge and highly diversified conglomerates, (chaebol), have been the
main carriers of the development of the electronics industry.14  Almost without exception,
the chaebol have targeted those segments of the electronics industry that require huge
investment outlays and sophisticated mass production techniques for fairly homogeneous
products like microwave ovens, TV sets, VCRs, computer monitors, picture tubes and
computer memories, especially DRAMs.  The result has been a heavy focus on assembly-
type mass production activities related to lower-end consumer products and standard
electronic components, and a weakness in more design-intensive sectors of the computer
industry.
Why did Taiwanese firms succeed in the computer industry, while their much larger and
resource-rich Korean counterparts have largely failed?  The answer lies in the fundamental
characteristics of an industry in which high volatility and uncertainty put a premium on
flexibility and the capacity to adjust to abrupt and frequently unexpected changes in demand
and technology.  Small firm size can foster such flexibility15 . By combining incremental
product innovation with incredibly fast speed-to-market, Taiwanese firms have been able to
establish a strong international market position relatively early in the product cycle.
The primary source of this flexibility appears to be the specific organization of the domestic
supply base in Taiwan, especially for parts and components.  Two main features of this
domestic supply base have contributed to the flexibility of Taiwanese producers, the first
being an extreme form of specialization.  By engaging in single tasks and by producing,
purchasing and selling in small lots, subcontractors avoid heavy fixed capital costs.  This, in
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 Chen, Tain-Jy et al, 1995
14
 For a detailed analysis, see Ernst, 1994a and 1997c..
15
  For the underlying argument, see Acs and Audretsch,1992. For a critical assessment, see Harrison, 1994.
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turn, makes it relatively easy to shift production at relatively short notice, and with a
minimum of costs.  The second feature is a certain network structure of multiple, volatile
and short-term links that involve only limited financial and technology transfers.  Spot-
market transactions play an important role, but so do "temporary spider web" arrangements
that are assembled for the duration of a particular job.16The result of these characteristics is
an extreme form of open and volatile  production networks, arguably even more so than the
highly flexible production networks that characterize California's Silicon Valley.17  Firms
maximize the number of jobs in order to compensate for the razor-thin profit margins; as a
result, they avoid being locked into a particular production network.  Domestic supplier
networks thus have been highly flexible and capable of rapid change, but short-lived and
foot-loose.
If flexibility constitutes one prerequisite for Taiwan’s competitive success in computers,
economies of scale and scope and speed-to-market have been of equal importance.18  Entry
barriers have increased for those stages of the value chain which are of critical importance
for competitive success, including particularly component manufacturing where production-
related scale economies remain important.  But the epicenter of competition has shifted
beyond manufacturing to R&D and other forms of intangible investment required to
complement price competition with product differentiation and speed-to-market.  Only those
companies can survive that are able to get the right product to the highest volume segment
of the market at the right time.  Being late is a disaster, and often forces companies out of
business.
In sum, what really matters for competitive success are substantial investments in the
formation of a firm's technological and organizational capabilities.  How were Taiwanese
computer companies able to successfully compete in an industry where size-related
advantages are of critical importance?  And, more specifically, what kind of organizational
innovations have enabled Taiwanese firms to overcome their size-related disadvantages?
In order to answer these questions, we need to examine issues of specialization and
coordination.  Andersen (1996) has recently provided an interesting theoretical explanation
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 For details, see Shieh 1990; and Lam and Lee 1993, p.112. Individual firms often bid for contracts beyond
their own capacities; once a supplier gets the contract, it calls on other firms, often competitors, to help fill
the order.
17
 For an analysis of Silicon Valley-type production networks, see Saxenian, 1990.
18
 Chandler, 1990, remains the most authoritative source. Economies of scale and scope in the computer
industry are analyzed in  Flamm, 1988 and 1990;  Ferguson, 1990; Ernst and O`Connor, 1992; and Ernst,
1997b
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why excessive specialization may involve substantial trade-offs.  He shows that, as an
economy becomes more specialized, this increases the pressure for standardization.  In turn,
this may constrain innovation19.  The solution to this dilemma is the establishment of tight
linkages between firms along the supply chain that enhance the prospects for inter-
organizational knowledge creation, for instance between end product manufacturers and
component suppliers.20
To understand how Taiwan avoided the dangers of excessive specialization and established
tight inter-firm linkages, it is important to correct some popular misconceptions of the
Taiwanese model.  This is not an economy characterized by atomistic competition.  SMEs
do play an important role, yet they survive due to a combination of four forces: government
policies that facilitated market entry and upgrading; strong linkages with large Taiwanese
firms and business groups; the presence of foreign sales and manufacturing affiliates; and
early participation in international production networks.
III. The role of industrial development policies
Though Korea and Taiwan share many similarities, the two countries have chosen very
different policy approaches.  In the early 1960s, the Taiwanese government introduced
aggressive programs to encourage investment by domestic as well as foreign companies.21
In line with similar programs in Korea, these statutes provided generous tax incentives and
laid down rules to facilitate the acquisition of land for industrial use by investors and access
to utilities.  Four features however distinguished Taiwan’s approach.
First, no limits were set on the number of firms within each industry group, with the
exception of a few mining and utility industries.  Any domestic firm could invest and enjoy
the same tax and other privileges.  This open policy gave rise to intense domestic
competition, and was conducive to a diversified industry structure.
Second, the government actively promoted the development and modernization of Taiwan´s
SME sector.  The first of such policies, “The Rule for Promotion of Small and Medium
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 “While standardization appears to be a necessary consequence of the attempts of economic agents to exploit
economies of scale and to avoid dealing with impossible amounts of information, this may also lead to
difficulties for innovative activities.” Andersen, 1996, p.98.
20
 The primary source for such “user-producer linkages” remains Lundvall, 1988.
21
 The Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals was first promulgated in July 1954 to attract foreign
companies. In November 1955, this was followed by the Statute for Investment by Overseas Chines whose
purpose was to tap into the experiences and capital of the Overseas Chinese communities in Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia. Finally, the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment was enacted in September 1960.
(San Gee and Kuo, 1997)
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Enterprises”, was promulgated in 1967 and was subsequently revised several times as
Taiwan’s SMEs grew.  Government assistance to SMEs included market promotion,
management rationalization, cooperation and promoting strategic alliances, loans and
upgrading technology and labor training.22  Third, there was no discrimination against
smaller firms within the SME category.  Any firm, irrespective of size, could participate and
was treated equally.  This neutral policy was an important foundation for the development of
Taiwan´s large pool of vibrant and entrepreneurial SMEs.
Finally, virtually equal treatment was granted to domestic and foreign investment, with the
exception of some majority share-holding regulations applicable to foreign firms and strict
foreign exchange control regulations governing domestic firms.  This balanced policy
attracted foreign investment without producing the “crowding-out” that occurred in
Singapore, where domestic firms have played a minimal role in the manufacturing sector23.
In sum, Taiwan’s development strategy generated forward and backward linkage effects,
while relying on “market-augmenting” policies that reduced risk and uncertainty rather than
market-repressing policies that increased fragmentation and rent-seeking.24  Taiwan’s policy
approach was not a static one, however; as the requirements of industrial upgrading changed
over time, so did the nature of state intervention.  This continuous upgrading of industrial
policies has been an important defining element of Taiwan´s approach to knowledge
creation.
Policy requirements keep changing over time for two simple reasons: increasing complexity
and a greater exposure to the international economy. As Taiwan´s industry moves up from
simple and labor-intensive to more complex products, much more sophisticated policies are
required. The main reason is that entry barriers rise with increasing complexity: investment
thresholds increase and knowledge requirements become more demanding. For small
enterprises this implies that they need to have access to externalities that would enable them
to overcome their size-related disadvantages25.
A greater exposure to the international economy is a second reason why industrial
development policies need to develop over time. An increasing complexity of the domestic
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 Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), 1991
23
 For an analysis of such crowding-out affects on potential domestic investment in Southeast Asia, see  Lim,
Linda and Peng Eng Fong, 1991.
24
 Johnson, 1987, p.141.
25
 Externality requirements vary, depending on the market segment and the stage of development of a particular
industry. For consumer electronics, they are obviously less demanding than for semiconductors. And within
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industry necessitates more international linkages. Such linkages are necessary to facilitate
local capability formation. They encompass not only critical imports of key components and
capital equipment and inward FDI. Such linkages also involve participation in international
production networks as well as in a variety of specialized and informal “international peer
group” networks that are essential carriers of knowledge creation, especially in the computer
industry. Left on their own, small enterprises are ill-equipped to reap the benefits of such
international linkages. Again, the market needs to be complemented by selective policy
interventions that can provide some of the necessary externalities
This process of change can be traced through Taiwan´s industrial policies that affected the
electronics industry.26 In 1958, the US Aid Mission announced that it would phase out US
aid to Taiwan in the 1960s, forcing Taiwanese policy-makers to find alternative ways to earn
foreign exchange27.  The US contracted Stanford Research Institute (SRI), a commercial
consultancy company to select priority industries for export promotion that were of potential
interest to foreign investors.  Not surprisingly, SRI chose those product groups where
American companies had strong interests: certain petrochemical intermediates, plastic
resins, synthetic fibers, transistors radios, electronic components, watches and clocks.
At the time, the most widely publicized “breakthrough” was an investment by General
Instruments, in 1964, producing transistor radios.  The irony is that, soon after, General
Instruments pulled out of consumer electronics altogether.  Two years later, however, in
1966, General Instrument’s Microelectronics Division established its semiconductor
assembly line, marking the beginning of Taiwan´s semiconductor industry.28  Over time, this
affiliate acted as an important incubator for local start-up companies: eleven local
companies were founded by former GI employees.29  The Taiwanese government did not
blindly follow SRI`s advice, however; it simultaneously discussed opportunities with
Japanese and European firms.  Taiwan´s entry into the television industry began with
investments in the early 1960s by Philips, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, NEC and Sanyo.
                                                                                                                                                     
the same product group, i.e. semiconductors, such requirements become much more complex, once the focus
shifts from low-end discrete devices for consumer applications to higher-end design-intensive devices.
26
 The following is based on San Gee and Wen-jeng Kuo, 1997; San Gee, 1995; Kobayashi, 1995; Meaney,
1994; Kajiwara, 1993; Liu, 1993; Schive, 1990 and 1993; and Wong Poh Kam, 1995
27
 The following is based on Gold, 1986, chapter 6.
28
  Between 1969 and 1973, Taiwan experienced a wave of offshore chip assembly investments, with Philips,
Texas Instruments and RCA being the lead actors. See Ernst, 1983.
29
 San Gee and Kuo, 1997. Furthermore, Morris Chang, one of the main drive forces behind the development
of Taiwan´s semiconductor industry and now the president of ITRI, had been before the CEO of General
Instruments in the U.S.
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In the early 1960s, the Taiwanese government introduced a series of path-breaking
institutional and policy innovations that were instrumental in the shift to export promotion.
The first was the statute for technical cooperation, issued in 1962, under which re-
investment and the remittance of technology fees accompanying joint ventures were
permitted; this had the effect of attracting technology from foreign companies.  Much better
known is the second innovation: the 1965 Law on the Establishment and Management of
Export Processing Zones, first implemented in December 1966 in Kaohsiung, a port city in
the south of the island.
Once the policy focus shifted to secondary import substitution, the provision of external
economies becomes critical.  In 1973, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)
was established as part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  ITRI soon moved beyond its
original task, which was to develop applied industrial technologies for key components and
capital equipment.  Equally important tasks now included international technology scanning
and acquisition; technology transfer from foreign sources to the domestic SME sector; the
development of a nation-wide infrastructure; and the formation of specialized clusters of
support industries.  ITRI and its specialized divisions30 also proved a source of “migratory
knowledge”31 for the electronics and computer industries: top researchers and engineers
were continuously encouraged to move out into the private sector and to establish innovative
start-up companies.  Typical examples of such spin-offs include UMC and Winbond, both of
which today have become serious competitors in the integrated circuit industry.
During the 1980s, policy shifted toward industrial targeting, especially for the computer
industry.  In 1980, the government established an industrial park almost entirely devoted to
IC manufacturing and computer design, the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park (HSIP).
Hsinchu offered a large range of fiscal and related investment incentives to attract qualified
investment32.  In turn, companies that have invested in the park must spend a certain
proportion of their revenues on R&D and a minimum percentage of their work force must be
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 Two such divisions have played a critical role for the development of Taiwan´s computer industry: the
Electronic Research Service Organization (ERSO) that has focused on the development of key components
(especially ICs and LCDs); and  the  Computer and Communications Research Laboratories (CCL) that
focuses on the development of new architectural designs for computers, communications and consumer
electronics.
31
 This term was coined by Joseph L. Badaracco Jr. (1991, pages 33-47) who defines it as knowledge, both
explicit and tacit, embodied in individuals who migrate from one organization or country to another.
32
 Liu, 1993, pages 306 and 307. This includes low-interest loans, the right to retain earnings of up to 200
percent of paid-in-capital, a five-year income tax holiday within the first nine years of operation, accelerating
depreciation of R&D equipment, and low-cost land.
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scientists and engineers.  Located close to ITRI and two well-known technology-oriented
universities, Hsinchu was able to replicate to some degree a “Silicon Valley”-type informal
network that helped to quickly diffuse new technology to Taiwan´s computer industry.  The
park’s close links with Silicon Valley—many of the top executives and engineers of
Hsinchu-based companies have worked in the US—facilitated a rapid response to changing
technology and international markets.
Throughout these various policy changes, however, the government maintained a
willingness to assist Taiwanese SMEs in overcoming their size-related disadvantages.  In the
computer industry, the best example is the case of the notebook PC consortium, established
by CCL/ITRI in April 1990.33  Against strong protest of the leading domestic PC
manufacturers, like Acer, the government refused to set any entry requirements, except an
initial entry fee of $48,000 - a sum which even an SME could well afford to pay.  The result
was that 46 firms became members of this consortium, and thus had equal access to design
specifications and prototypes, detailed technical reports for each stage of development,
motherboard designs, mass production samples and training classes.  This example
illustrates a peculiar feature of industrial policy making in Taiwan noted above; the
government supports multiple firms in any technology initiative, constantly putting pressure
on existing players by bringing in new companies or lower-tier firms. This has created a
powerful vehicle for inter-organizational knowledge creation.
Of course, such a government policy to stimulate knowledge creation through market entry
and competition comes at a cost.  Some of these SMEs later fail due to a lack of sufficient
resources and capabilities.  Acer's Stan Shih claims that by supporting smaller firms,
“...[t]he government has become our major competitor.”34  The consortium also failed to
distinguish the different capabilities and needs of member firms.  As all firms were able to
share the common design, “...[t]he only way a member could compete with other alliance
members was to reduce the sales price of the common product, which resulted in a price
war.”35
Yet, such costs have to be measured against the substantial benefits of these policies, which
helped integrate parts of Taiwan's SME sector into the computer industry and generated a
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critical mass of knowledge. This particular type of industrial policy has also helped to
develop Taiwan's flexible and low-cost domestic subcontracting system and its linkages
with large domestic and foreign firms; it is to these network relations that I now turn.
IV. The role of inter-organizational linkages
We have seen that small, family-owned firms have played an important role in the
development of Taiwan´s electronics industry. This had considerable advantages, both in
terms of cost and flexibility: transaction costs were low, as family-run enterprises
cooperated on the basis of informal social contacts.  Outsourcing could be performed at
much lower cost, risks could be substantially reduced, and information circulated much
more quickly.
This type of arrangement is now coming under increasing pressure, and appears to be ill-
equipped to deal with the new competitive requirements.  Family bonds erode, especially
when the firm has to move production overseas and loose networks between family-owned
SMEs are unable to raise the capital required for increasing fixed investments and R&D
outlays. As a result, Taiwanese SMEs had to develop a variety of linkages with more
powerful third parties. Such linkages include informal peer group networks; the
government´s Center-Satellite program; the integration of small firms into loose cross-
sectoral business groups; and variations in the business group model, centered around a
holding company.  It is difficult to say which of these different linkage arrangements are
most effective to cope with the dual challenge of knowledge creation and
internationalization.  We find that Taiwanese SMEs as well as the government have pursued
a plurality of approaches in parallel, rather than concentrating exclusively on one particular
linkage.  In this section I focus on domestic linkages; yet, as Taiwan´s electronics industry is
deeply rooted in international production networks, I cannot avoid dealing now with some of
these international linkages.
a) Informal “peer group” networks
Taiwanese SMEs have always relied heavily on informal social networks for access to
resources, capabilities and knowledge that they are unable to mobilize on their own.  Over
time, the focus of these networks has shifted from labor, capital and basic market
information to technological knowledge and brand name recognition.  Originally, these
networks were restricted to family and kinship relations.  They are now rapidly being
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substituted by professional “peer group” networks.  This is especially true for the electronics
industry where resource and capability requirements are much more demanding than in
traditional industries, and where participation in international knowledge networks is of the
essence.
Informal peer group networks come in a variety of forms.  Typically, class mates (especially
in elite schools) and former colleagues (especially in foreign affiliates) form tight networks
that can be instrumental in the creation of start-up companies.  For example, Taiwanese
SMEs rely heavily on informal information exchange with former classmates for the
generation of tacit knowledge on specific engineering and marketing problems and when
they need confidential information on potential partners or competitors.  Interviews at Acer
for instance showed that even today, when this company has long moved beyond its earlier
SME status, senior managers still prefer to contact former teachers or class mates when they
have to deal with a specific engineering, marketing or management problem rather than a
commercial consultancy firm or a technology research institute.
Acer actually has been a master in the formation of such informal networks; much of its
success arguably is due to the scope and depth of its peer group linkages.  Founded in 1976
as Multitech International Corp., with a registered capital of just $25,000 and 11 employees,
the company’s first activity was to run a training center for computer engineers.  In the first
three years, more than 3,000 engineers were trained who later were to occupy important
positions in Taiwan´s nascent computer industry.  As a result, Acer was able to establish
early on an extensive network of social contacts within Taiwan´s computer community.
These contacts have become an important asset.  Since 1986, Acer Sertek Inc, the
company’s domestic sales, marketing and service arm, has trained more than 170,000
Taiwanese students in computer use36.
b) A hierarchical Center-Satellite system
Another attempt to overcome the disadvantages of small firm size has been the government's
Center-Satellite Program (CS), launched in 1984, in response to the private sector's
reluctance to vertically integrate production through either merger or inter-firm cooperation.
The objective of this program has been to eliminate cutthroat competition and destructive
price cutting practices by encouraging closer, interdependent and long-term ties between
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larger "center" firms (upstream suppliers, final assemblers, large trading companies) and
their "satellites" (especially component suppliers).
The CS program is an attempt by the Taiwanese government to copy the Japanese “keiretsu”
system.  It is run by the semi-official Center-Satellite Development Industrial Coordination
Center.37  In each CS system, the central plants assume the responsibility to coordinate,
monitor, and upgrade the operations of their satellite plants.  In order to strengthen these
links, the government provides a variety of financial, manpower training and technical
engineering assistance to both the central plants and the satellites.
On paper, the CS-system is attractive, as it addresses the needs of both large and smaller
companies.  For center companies, the expected benefits include a lower fixed investment
burden due to outsourcing and the sharing of investment outlays; access to the specialized
capabilities of satellites; cost reduction due to lower wages paid by satellites; economies of
scale and scope, especially if satellites supply the needs of several central firms; and the use
of satellites as a buffer against market fluctuations.  For satellites, expected benefits include
assured orders; access to materials and components; access to technology and improved
learning possibilities; and access to markets.
Most assessments conclude that the CS program so far has been only partially successful.38
Yet, these assessments need to be placed in a broader context.  Over the last few years, the
CS program has generated an increasing variety of linkages between SMEs and large firms,
linkages that frequently extend beyond national boundaries.  Government policies to
promote CS networks were particularly successful in accelerating the outward investment of
SMEs to Southeast Asia and China.  Once a foreign lead company of an OEM network had
invested in these regions, this exerted a powerful pressure on Taiwanese satellites to follow
suit and to move their production offshore.  In many cases, this has had the unanticipated
effect of "hollowing-out" the domestic supplier system.
In order to correct and avoid such negative impacts, both government policies and firm
strategies are currently being adjusted.  Government policies now pay more attention to
assisting SMEs to upgrade their domestic activities.  This applies especially to incentives for
technology diffusion and product-related R&D; incentives for training; policies to improve
infrastructure and access to telecommunications services: and policies to improve financial
services.  For their part, firms are striving to diversify and internationalize their ownership,
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and to reap broader benefits from international specialization and the building of proprietary
assets.
I have argued earlier that industrial parks and, later on, science parks played a major role in
the development of Taiwan's locational advantages.  This organizational innovation is now
being transferred abroad, especially to the Southern Coastal provinces of China and South
East Asia.  Over the last few years, there has been a rapid proliferation of special business
zones and industrial estates that are geared primarily to the needs of Taiwanese small - and
medium - sized computer companies.
The original role models are the “shoe city” and the “textile city” established in the Southern
Coastal Chinese province of Fujian.  This has been followed by similar arrangements in the
electronics industry, such as two “Cities of Electronics” (in Fujian and Guangdong
provinces of China), the Penang Scientific Park in Malaysia, the Kung-Hua Industrial Park
on Batan Island (Indonesia), and the Subic Bay Industrial Park in the Philippines.
Since the Taiwanese government cannot openly act as a third party for political reasons, we
find a variety of intermediary institutional approaches that provide similar services.  The
largest project so far has been the conversion of Subic Bay, the former US naval base in the
Philippines, into a major industrial park, primarily for Taiwanese and American electronics
firms. The idea is to enable Taiwanese subcontractors to move jointly with their large
Taiwanese lead contractors and major American OEM clients.  The provision of low-interest
loans by the International Economic Cooperation and Development Fund (IECDF), Taiwan's
foreign aid program, is designed to help Taiwanese SMEs to invest in Subic Bay and other
neighboring locations39.  The goal is to transfer parts of the domestic Taiwanese supply base
for components and sub-assemblies to Southeast Asia, so that final assemblers of monitors,
motherboards and PCs and other PC-related products can have access on the spot to low-
cost and flexible support industries.40
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At the same time, this creates new mechanisms for inter-organizational knowledge creation.
Take the case of Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc., the world's second-largest
independent contract assembler of ICs, which already has a plant in Penang, Malaysia, to
supplement its parent facility in Kaohsiung.  ASE now wants to expand in Subic Bay as
well.  The company already uses Filipino workers in Kaohsiung and has given them
intensive training.  Since the Taiwanese government allows foreign workers to work in
Taiwan for two years only, ASE will send them to Subic Bay as trainers of its workforce
there.
c) Linkages with large domestic firms: cross-sectoral business groups
Contrary to conventional wisdom, large firms have played a central role in the coordination
and development of the Taiwanese production system. They have also facilitated knowledge
creation in small firms. After the second world war, the Taiwanese government took over
the Japanese enterprises that had been established during the 50 years of colonial rule (1895-
1945).  In contrast to Korea, the government did not privatize these firms, instead, they were
run as public enterprises.  By developing a strong public enterprise sector, Taiwan
developed companies large enough to enter the highly capital-intensive production of basic
materials, while at the same time avoiding the dominance of private conglomerates.41
Linkages with large firms have played an important role in the development of Taiwan´s
SME sector.  To start with, SMEs depend on the supply of basic materials provided by large
public enterprises at low cost and high quality.42  Large firms have also acted as an
important intermediary source of capital for SMEs.  Taiwan's banks direct most of their
funds to large domestic public and private firms who then on-lend money for equipment and
working capital to smaller customers, subcontractors and suppliers at higher rates through
trade credit and loans on the informal curb market.43
It is important to emphasize that many SMEs are for all practical purposes members of a
particular business group.44 The growing capital requirements and technological complexity
that accompanied the rapid industrial transformation of the island produced new forms of
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business organization. When electronics took over from textiles as the leading industrial
sector, this led to an erosion of Taiwan´s traditional form of business organization: the loose
networks of family-owned SMEs.  In order to retain profitability, family firms were forced
to venture across product lines and to move from industries with declining margins, like
textiles, to the much more profitable electronics sector. In most cases however they were
unable to raise the capital required for increasing fixed investment and R&D: as late as
1992, only 20 percent of a sample of Taiwanese manufacturing firms were engaged in
R&D.45
Attempts to cope with these two conflicting pressures produced a peculiar Taiwanese form
of business organization: cross-sectoral business groups.  These business groups are very
different from the large, hierarchical conglomerates, the chaebol, that are typical of South
Korea46, but they also differ from the keiretsu system that has dominated much of Japan’s
industry.  In Taiwan, business groups typically consist of a loose network of mostly
medium-sized companies that produce a variety of products for different markets, with one
core company exercising financial control. This type of firm organization reflects the need to
combine the scale advantages of large firms with the speed and flexibility of smaller firms.
The ADI business group provides a typical example. Founded in 1979, the company is run
by the Liao Jian-cheng family.  From trading and construction it first moved into shoe
manufacturing for international mass merchandisers.  Around the mid-1980s, the family
decided to move into electronics.  The breakthrough came in 1993, thanks to big orders from
Compaq.  Despite success in computer monitors, the owners maintain their diversification
strategy.  ADI has continued to expand its position in shoe manufacturing, while at the same
time investing in a number of new small start-up companies in software, system design, and
in a variety of unrelated commercial activities.
The shift to business groups has been most pronounced in the electronics industry.  This is
hardly surprising, given the critical importance in this industry of economies of scale and
scope.  But in Taiwan’s case, there are two additional reasons why SMEs became integrated
into larger business groups: linkages with foreign customers through international
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subcontracting and OEM arrangements; and linkages with international supply sources,
especially for key components.  As a result of these linkages, size became essential to secure
economies of scale and scope and achieve sufficient bargaining clout with foreign customers
and suppliers.
To fulfil an OEM contract, large Taiwanese companies like Tatung, First International
Computer (which is part of the Formosa Plastics group), Mitac and Acer rely on hundreds of
loosely affiliated domestic suppliers to which they can pass on an endless variety of low-
margin, yet quite demanding manufacturing and design tasks.  The typical Taiwanese small
computer company thus often gets involved with foreign firms only in an indirect way; large
Taiwanese business groups dominate the direct interface with foreign customers.  The same
is true for the affiliates of foreign multinationals like Philips, Matsushita, DEC and others
that have substantial production platforms in Taiwan.
A similar mechanism also works on the procurement side, especially for high-end key
components like DRAMs, microprocessors, CRT picture tubes for computer monitors and
liquid crystal displays (LCDs) for laptop computers.  The insecurity of supply plays an
important role in the formation of inter-corporate linkages. Roughly 85 percent of all
semiconductors used in Taiwan are currently imported.  Under “normal” circumstances,
Taiwanese SMEs rely on the “spot market”: they purchase these components from the
branch offices or agents of foreign component vendors.  But normal circumstances are rare
in these component markets.  When a serious component supply shortage occurs, Taiwanese
SMEs will be the worst hit.  Foreign vendors will either require sharp price mark-ups or
refuse to deliver.
For SMEs, the only hope is to survive in the shadow of the large Taiwanese PC
manufacturers.  During a typical supply shortage, the large Taiwanese manufacturers will
expand their procurement orders well beyond their real needs. By buying large quantities of
components before price wars actually materialize, firms seek to buffer their effects; one
could call this the “component future trading” effect.  Firms also seek to hedge against
opportunism on the part of foreign suppliers.  Major Taiwanese PC companies simply must
keep large safety inventories of key components as a risk minimization strategy.  Third,
during shortages, foreign component suppliers normally only supply their strategic
customers.  For Taiwanese PC makers it is of critical importance to get on such “strategic
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customer” lists.  The way to do this is to inflate their component orders above their real
needs to convince foreign suppliers that the Taiwanese customers are big and important.
As a result of these purchasing strategies, Taiwanese PC makers regularly get bogged down
with large inventories of key components.  The product composition of these inventories
keeps rapidly changing, with newer component generations vying for precious inventory
space with older ones.  Taiwanese PC makers are thus under strong pressure to resell parts
of their component inventories to local SMEs.  Most of these re-sales are components “one-
generation-behind-the-leading-edge”.  Prices charged are higher than the prices paid by the
large PC maker to the foreign supplier, but lower than those charged on the spot market.47
In sum, the only way for Taiwanese PC-related SMEs to survive periodic supply shortages
for key components is to stay in the shadow of the large domestic PC makers and to accept
the crumbs that the big guys are willing to share with them.  The prices charged for these
crumbs are substantial.  Yet, what matters from the perspective of the SME is that they can
get access to these vital components and that the prices they pay are lower than those they
would pay in the spot market.  This situation obviously puts a tremendous pressure on the
existing Taiwanese SME population: only those SMEs can survive that succeed in ruthlessly
cutting cost and overhead, while accepting the most exacting contract conditions in terms of
delivery times.  The result is a high turnover of the existing SME population: at any given
point in time, a large number of firms goes bankrupt, while an equally large number of firms
emerges as new start-up companies.
Over the last few years, the importance of big business groups has further increased, blurring
the division between small and large firms.  Taiwan's electronics industry has recently
witnessed a rapid increase of concentration.  In the PC industry, the top 10 firms today
control roughly 80 percent of total production, and some of the most powerful Taiwanese
business groups (Formosa Plastics, HwaHsin, China Steel, YFY Paper) have now also
entered the production of key components, like DRAMs, CRTs and displays.
d) Business groups centered around a holding company
Many Taiwanese computer companies have experienced very rapid growth since the last
industry shake-out in 1992; the challenge now is to develop an organization that enables
them to improve organizational learning. For PC manufacturers, the main role model is the
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Client-Server model. A rapidly growing company like Acer or Mitac spins business units
into independent profit centers, creating a federation of loosely connected companies united
by four factors: access to common core technologies; access to the holding company's
financial resources; access to its knowledge base, market intelligence and technology
scanning capabilities; and a common  brand name.  This type of organizational innovation
makes it possible to keep high value-added operations and core capabilities in Taiwan, while
dispersing sales, marketing, procurement, product integration and service operations around
the world, in close proximity to the main growth markets.
Each of the different members of a “Client-Server Organization” are separated by product
lines and by geographic region, and each operates independently from the other.  This allows
them to make decisions quickly in response to market changes and to define the market
segments where they feel fit for leadership.  At the same time, however, all of these
businesses have ready access to the lead company`s knowledge base.
One important element of this re-organization is a new approach to overseas PC assembly.
Acer provides an example.48  In order to reduce cost and increase speed-to-market for new
products, Acer has established 15 modular assembly sites around the world.  Each of these
assembly subsidiaries is located close to important markets and performs only very limited
activities: it receives PC housings and floppy disk drives by sea, with motherboards flown in
directly to ensure delivery of the newest technologies.  Central processing units (CPUs),
hard drives and memory are sourced locally to fill individual user requirements, and the
modular components are assembled quickly according to a standardized procedure.  This
strategy allows Acer to maintain control over product quality and keep inventory to a
minimum, while providing fast assembly of competitively priced PCs that always contain
the latest microprocessor generation.
The Taiwanese "client-server" model comes strikingly close to the basic philosophy of many
proponents of corporate re-engineering, especially the model that IBM's previous chairman
John Akers had tried to implement for the ailing giant before he was ousted.49  Yet, the basic
motivation of firms like Acer has been fundamentally different from those of IBM; the goal
is not to reduce the cost of excessive centralization, but to overcome some size-related
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barriers to knowledge creation and internationalization without repeating the mistakes of
excessive integration characteristic of US, European and Japanese firms.
V. The catalytic role of inward FDI
Inward FDI played an important catalytic role for knowledge creation during the critical
early phase of the development of Taiwan´s electronics industry.  It exposed Taiwanese
workers and managers to new organizational techniques, which, while not necessarily “best
practice”, contributed to a gradual erosion of traditional, highly authoritarian and ultimately
inefficient management practices.  The need to comply to some minimum international
quality standards gave rise to learning effects that spilled over to a wide spectrum of local
enterprises due to the high turnover in Taiwan´s skilled labor market.  A questionnaire
survey of 318 Taiwanese electronics firms found that 104 of these companies had high-level
managers and engineers with work experience in foreign electronics firms.50  Of these,
roughly 43 percent felt that their working experience with foreign firms was helpful for their
management skills, 31 percent said that it was useful for product design and development,
and almost 30 percent that it enhanced their capacity to generate market information.
Inward FDI also contributed to the development of local suppliers, at least for domestic
market-oriented production.  A combination of protection and local content requirements,
directed especially at Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers, forced these companies
to pull along their main Japanese component suppliers.  Together, they systematically
groomed local vendors and established a broad range of local supplier networks.
a) Consumer electronics
These FDI-related linkages first emerged in consumer electronics.  The pioneer was Philips
which in 1961 established a large local manufacturing affiliate that produced TV sets, audio
equipment, picture tubes and a variety of other related components.  Originally, this
production facility was geared to the heavily protected local market, but by the mid-1960s,
domestic market-oriented production had been supplemented by export platform production.
Philips Taiwan is now the exclusive production source for picture tubes for computer
monitors within the entire Philips group, and is among the three largest producers
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worldwide51.  Similarly, Philips played a critical role in the successful launching of Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) which today is the world’s leading
silicon foundry.
In 1962, Matsushita followed suit with a large majority-owned joint venture in Keelung that
produced both household appliances and consumer electronics, primarily TV sets.52  Until
the mid-1980s when the group established a network of huge export platform affiliates in
Malaysia and Thailand, this was one of Matsushita’s main outposts in East Asia.53
Matsushita´s affiliate has been a trend-setter for Taiwan in factory automation (especially for
printed circuit board assembly) and for the introduction of fastidious quality control
management.54  In addition to being an incubator for local suppliers, Matsushita established
Matsushita Electric Institute of Technology in 1981.  With a work force of around 40
researchers, the institute’s main functions are ASIC design and software engineering,
especially the development of Chinese-language application programs.
Matsushita has also given rise to a broad range of knowledge spill-overs to local companies,
through both employment mobility and the formation of local start-up companies.  One
particularly interesting example is the case of Fulet Electronics Industrial Co. Ltd., a
producer of high-end consumer electronics.55  The owner of this company is the son of C.C.
Hong, Matsushita´s original local joint venture partner.  For many years, Hong served as the
chairman of Matsushita Electric (Taiwan).  Yet, despite his 40 percent share in the venture’s
capital, Japanese managers were clearly running the show.  Hong was given a free hand to
build up close technical and business ties with several hundred local suppliers.  Building on
his father’s unbeatable connections within the local Taiwanese supplier community, Hong
Junior (Hong Ming-t`ai) pursued a niche market strategy.  By sourcing out a large part of
manufacturing, Fulet can concentrate on design and product development.  Two figures are
revealing: Fulet claims to spend roughly 15 percent of sales on R&D; and it classifies 15
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percent of its 800 employees as R&D personnel.56  This example shows how a Taiwanese
start-up company can exploit the domestic supplier networks that were originally established
for Matsushita, in order to further its knowledge creation.
Matsushita´s smaller rival Sanyo57 established its own production line in 1963, with a
roughly similar product mix as Matsushita’s, followed by Hitachi in 1965 and Sony in 1967.
These Japanese firms also developed close links with local suppliers, but focused much
longer on the domestic market; export platform production remained the exception.58
Because the domestic market strategy could tolerate a certain degree of inefficiency and
lower quality standards, Japanese consumer electronics affiliates in Taiwan had considerable
decision autonomy not only for employment, work practices and salary, but also on how to
organize production and procurement.  A considerable amount of local linkages was
generated by these investments: local content was substantial, and gave rise to some
domestic support industries, especially for low-end general purpose components59. All of
these were powerful mechanisms for inter-organizational knowledge creation.
Toshiba pursued a different strategy60.  During the 1950s, it acquired a 5 percent equity
share in Tatung Co., Taiwan´s only integrated electronics company.  Originally Tatung
served as an agent of Toshiba, selling its home appliances, consumer electronics and
telecommunications equipment.  In the 1960s however, Toshiba granted a number of
technology licenses to Tatung, which became a supplier of key components, such as high-
end compressors, CRT picture tubes and LCDs.  This, in turn, led to other forms of
cooperation.  In the mid-1970s for instance, Toshiba helped Tatung to capture OEM orders
from Sears (the large US mass merchandiser), with the result that Tatung became one of the
largest Taiwanese television exporters to the US. Tatung and Toshiba are now also engaged
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in a variety of OEM and technology cooperation agreements, involving monitors and other
PC-related products.
During the 1970s, Fujitsu followed with a similar approach: in 1973, it established a joint
venture with Tatung to sell and service Fujitsu computer systems and peripherals.  This
subsequently led to a variety of manufacturing joint ventures and OEM contracts, including
FDK Tatung (Thailand) Co. LTD/Bangpakong, an affiliate of Tatung's joint venture with
Fujitsu, called Tatung Fujidenka Co. Taiwan.  The mother company is in Yangmei, Taiwan
and produces high-end soft ferrit cores for TV sets, video display terminals and a variety of
electronic devices.  FDK Tatung today is one of the market leaders for the capital and
knowledge-intensive production of soft ferrit cores.  The sales of this affiliate are mainly
destined for affiliates of National (Matsushita), JVC, Murata and Tatung's Makolin affiliate
in Thailand and Malaysia.61
b) Components
The first round of investment in consumer electronics and telecommunications equipment
gave rise to a rapid growth in demand for electronic components.  While most of the high
value-added key components were imported, stringent local contents requirements and
increased local capacities resulted in growth of local production.  Starting from the mid-
1960s, Taiwan received substantial Japanese FDI in the production of electronics
components.
The pioneer was Mitsumi Electric Corp., a medium-sized component producer.  In 1967, its
first affiliate was established in Kaohsiung, producing condensers, transformers (including
coils), connectors, electro-mechanical subassemblies and other components.  Two years
later, in March 1969, this was followed by a second affiliate in Taipei, producing magnetic
heads, small motors, plus a variety of subassemblies and other components.  Similar
investments were undertaken by TDK in 1968, (condensers, transformers and other
components); by Hosiden in 1969, an Osaka-based producer of electromechanical
components; by Mitsubishi Materials in June 1970 (condensers); and by Alps in 1970
(resistors, magnetic heads and other devices).  In the 1970s, most of the leading Japanese
component producers set up shop in Taiwan or were engaged in consignment assembly with
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a growing share of output going to Japan or Japanese affiliates in Asia.  In response to the
combined effect of the Yen appreciation and the domestic recession, Japanese electronics
firms developed a regional supply base in the early 1990s that now include higher-end
components62.  There is little doubt that these investments played an important catalytic role
for knowledge creation in Taiwan´s domestic supplier industry, through intense on-the-job
training and employment turnover as well as through close linkages with local
subcontractors.
Taiwan however has also now become a critical market for components and production
equipment, especially for the computer industry and for the production of semiconductors,
CRT picture tubes and displays.  One consequence is that Japanese component
manufacturers have extended the mix of products that they produce in Taiwan to include an
increasing variety of computer-related components.  This has helped to upgrade knowledge
creation. For instance, both Sharp and Casio are today producing substantial volumes of
mid-level STN-LCDs in Taiwan.  Similar developments have occurred in semiconductors:
second-tier Japanese DRAM producers like Oki and MELCO have recently concluded
important technology licensing, second-sourcing and joint development projects with some
of the newly established Taiwanese DRAM producers.  The same is now happening for
large-size CRT picture tubes.
As Taiwanese component manufacturers have broadened their knowledge base, Japanese
firms are willing to engage in joint ventures and co-development projects; this has led to
substantial investments by Japanese production equipment vendors.  For example, Japan's
Shinetsu Handotai Co. has a 40 percent share of Taiwan's market for silicon-wafer chips.
The company's customers in Taiwan no longer want to depend on imports from Japan or
from Shinetsu's affiliate in Malaysia and insisted that Shinetsu establish a wafer fabrication
plant in Taiwan.  Given the huge demand from Taiwanese customers, Shinetsu complied
and established a new majority-owned $110 million joint venture in silicon-wafer
fabrication.  A second stage involving an additional $70 million investment is already
planned for the near future.  Shinetsu claims that, in terms of the technology used, “..there
will be no difference between the factories in Taiwan and in Japan”.63
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c) FDI in the computer industry
All of the investments reviewed so far have been in consumer electronics and component
manufacturing.  But what about FDI in the computer industry itself?  In the early 1960s,
IBM established an affiliate in Taiwan, where a few thousand people were employed wiring
core frames by hand.64 IBM´s move to Asia did not occur in isolation: its competitors also
established core plane wiring operations in Taiwan and Hong Kong.65  IBM thus gave rise to
a new model of international production for American electronics firms: the redeployment
of labor-intensive stages of final assembly to Asia.  These investments however consisted of
primitive “screw-driver” assembly and thus generated very limited localized knowledge.
The next round of computer-related FDI did not take place until the early 1980s.  In 1982,
DEC established a large integrated affiliate in Taiwan to produce a broad range of products:
PC motherboards and chassis, monitors, terminals and printers.  Today, DEC Taiwan is the
company’s largest assembly line for desktop PCs.  It is also Taiwan´s largest foreign-owned
PC manufacturer, employing 1600 people in March 1995.  For Taiwan, DEC´s investment
had important positive effects on knowledge creation, through training as well as through
the development of local suppliers.  For instance, DEC Taiwan is a major OEM buyer of
monitors from both Philips Taiwan and the Lite-on Group.  DEC also sources a broad range
of peripherals and components from local Taiwanese companies.
DEC´s investment was followed two years later, in 1984, by Hewlett Packard which
established a joint venture with Taiwan´s Nanya Plastics (part of the Formosa plastics
group) for producing multi-layered printed circuit boards.  This venture involved a
substantial transfer of technology and capabilities.  On the basis of this successful project,
HP has transferred more complex technology and thus has given a major boost to the
development of Taiwan´s capabilities in motherboard production.  In cooperation with the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and with large local conglomerates like the President
Enterprises Group,66 HP Taiwan has aggressively promoted the spread of computer-based
factory automation.
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Despite these and a few other cases of inward FDI in the computer industry, it is fair to say
that such investments have played only a marginal role for the development of Taiwan´s
computer industry.  Foreign computer companies did make an important contribution yet
such linkages worked primarily through the rapid proliferation of international outsourcing
arrangements: these arrangements include subcontracting, consignment assembly and
various forms of OEM contracts,67 and are no longer confined to parts and components but
involve high-value added support services such as product customization, product design
and production technology.  It is to these international production networks that I now turn.
VI. Participation in International Production Networks
American computer companies like Apple, IBM, DEC, Compaq and HP have been pioneers
in the subcontracting of component manufacturing, contract assembly, the spread of OEM,
and more recently ODM arrangements that enable them to concentrate on what they do best.
Japanese computer companies only followed suit during the early 1990s, once their tight
grip over their domestic market was challenged by the aggressive price war strategies of
American computer companies.68
Today, it is normal that the supply chain of a computer company spans different time zones
and continents.  For instance, final assembly is most likely dispersed to major growth
markets in the US, Europe and Asia; microprocessors are sourced  from the US; memory
devices from Japan and Korea; motherboards from Taiwan; HDDs from Singapore;
monitors from Korea, Taiwan and Japan: keyboards and power switch supplies from
Taiwan, and so forth.
The picture gets blurred however as many of these suppliers in turn ship their products from
widely dispersed overseas affiliates.  Taiwanese OEM suppliers have shifted a growing
share of their production to low-cost production sites in Southeast Asia and China.  Since
1992, Taiwan's PC industry has experienced an extremely rapid expansion of overseas
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production. In value terms, the ratio of overseas production out of Taiwan's total PC
production has increased from 10.4 percent in 1992, to 14.9 percent in 1993, 20.6 percent in
1994, and 27.2 percent in 1995.69  For 1996, the OPR is estimated to have increased to
almost 30 percent.  Throughout this short period, annual growth in overseas production
value was consistently over 70 percent, which implies that overseas production today plays a
critical role for the success and failure of Taiwan's PC industry.
Most of the overseas production of Taiwanese computer companies is concentrated in
neighboring regions in China (most of it in China's southern coastal provinces) and in
Southeast Asia.  For instance, out of the 95 overseas production sites of Taiwanese PC firms
that have been registered by MIC, 75 production sites, i.e. almost 80 percent have been
located in East Asia (exclusive of Japan).  China alone has attracted 41 investments, i.e. 43
percent of the total.70
The logistic complexity of the new IPNs is not simply a result of their geographic spread; it
is also a function of an increasingly complex division of labor.  Each IPN combines
different, hierarchically structured and closely interacting sub-networks.  For example, an
American computer company such as IBM or Compaq is linked to first-tier contractors, say
an American disk drive producer like Seagate with its IPN, or large Taiwanese OEM
contractors like Acer.  At the next level, we find medium-sized, specialized Taiwanese
contractors like Delta Electronics, a major producer of switching power supplies that has
production facilities in Thailand, China and Mexico.  At the lowest levels, we find a myriad
of sub-production networks each centered around a small Taiwanese subcontractor many of
which have redeployed production to China or Southeast Asia. The complexity of such
arrangements becomes clear when we look at the major customers list of a firm like Delta
Electronics.71  This list reads like a Who’s Who in the computer industry and covers 24
leading computer companies from the US, Japan, Europe and Taiwan.72
In sum, Taiwanese firms in the electronics industry are deeply embedded in complex
international production networks that involve transactions between a large number of
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different national production systems.  The increasing complexity of IPN, however, has also
allowed small enterprises from a small nation to participate and upgrade their knowledge
base.
a) Key features of international production networks (IPNs)73
What factors have induced computer companies to increase their reliance on outsourcing
and hence to establish international production networks?  For a typical lead company in the
PC business, the cost of components, software and services purchased from outside, has
increased from less than 60 percent to more than 80 percent of total (ex factory) production
costs74.  As external sourcing relations become geographically dispersed and increasingly
complex, they are fraught with very high coordination costs: some firms report that the cost
of coordinating such outside relations can exceed in-house manufacturing costs75.  As a
result, the focus of cost reduction strategies is shifting from scale economies in
manufacturing to a reduction of the cost of external sourcing through rationalization and
internationalization.
Outsourcing is also motivated by a strategic concern: In order to survive the extremely
intense competition that is characteristic of the electronics industry, global competitors are
forced to concentrate on product development (architectural design), while at the same time
remaining a low-cost producer.  In order to meet these goals, firms tend to focus on R&D,
the production of some key components, limited involvement in the final assembly of higher
value-added products and marketing.  By outsourcing most of the other activities, the lead
company expects to reduce the high fixed capital costs and risks that result from large in-
house production facilities. Finally, the lead company may exploit competition among
potential suppliers to reduce production costs.
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Of central interest to us here are the interests of small suppliers such as Taiwan’s.
Participating in an IPN can provide various advantages, despite the continuing pressures for
cost cutting.76  Manufacturing on an OEM basis is a significant source of knowledge
creation for affiliated firms.  Not only do foreign purchasers supply specifications for OEM
suppliers, they also frequently send their engineers to help local manufacturers to meet
quality specifications.  Knowledge is thus transmitted in OEM production not only through
the supply of blueprints, but also through the interaction of personnel and the transfer of
more elusive, tacit dimensions of technology.77
Once the supplier has acquired the relevant technology and technical expertise, it may be
able to use them in manufacturing components or final products on an OEM basis for other
transnationals.  Taiwanese firms often participate in more than one IPN.  By manufacturing
for a number of assemblers on an OEM basis, they can achieve economies of scale; longer
production runs in turn justify the installation of capital equipment (and thus often better
quality control) which otherwise would not be warranted.  Furthermore, the provision of
letters of credit by the foreign purchaser can enable the local manufacturer to borrow
additional capital that can be invested in knowledge creation.
Another advantage for small suppliers is that participation in a production network avoids
the expense of building distribution, sales and service networks.  The costs of acquiring
knowledge about foreign consumer preferences, and of setting up the distribution and
service networks that are essential for penetrating foreign markets, pose a formidable
challenge even to large multinationals. This is particularly true in Japan.  Moreover, a move
to own-brand production risks a disruption of the technological links with purchasers
established under OEM relationships.  Firms seeking to produce under their own brand
name frequently find it more difficult to obtain technical advice from companies that
increasingly perceive them as rivals.
Manufacturers may gain a price premium from marketing under their own brand name, but
this premium may be negative if consumers associate the brand with poor quality.  Korean
exporters of consumer electronic products appeared to suffer this fate in the Japanese market
in the late 1980s, when inferior products coupled with inadequate service networks damaged
the reputation of Korean manufacturers.  Regardless of the quality of the product, the
identity with Korea or Taiwan may itself impose a penalty on manufacturers, while the
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location of manufacture is much less transparent when another firm's brand appears on the
product.
Marketing products under the firm's own brand name may place a company at the apex of
the pyramid of technological and marketing capabilities but Taiwanese companies have
found that the costs incurred in setting up distribution, sales and service networks can
outweigh the higher unit profits from OBM. In the 1990s, there have been significant
examples of a retreat from OBM, one of the most notable being the Taiwanese computer
company, Acer, which sustained significant losses in its efforts at own-brand sales in the US
market.78
As they upgrade their production skills and capabilities, small suppliers are often able to
change the bargaining relationship with the transnationals.  There is evidence of Taiwanese
firms moving from OEM to ODM, although still producing components or final products for
sale under another company's brand name.  In such circumstances, the balance of bargaining
power between supplier and purchaser shifts with the buyer becoming increasingly
dependent on the skills of the local company.  The ideal scenario from the perspective of the
OEM supplier would be that the transfer of skills from the purchaser eventually lead to the
hollowing out of the core competencies of the distributing company in the particular product
line.  This has been alleged to have occurred in the case of Samsung's manufacture of
microwave ovens for GE.79
b) Taiwan’s participation in international production networks
Taiwan´s entry as a supplier for the international computer industry dates back to the mid-
1960s.  The breakthrough came in 1966 when IBM set up its International Procurement
Office (IPO) and started to purchase computer parts and components from Taiwan.  IBM’s
demanding procedures for product development, production ramp-up and quality control as
well as its grueling requirements for vendor qualification forced Taiwanese firms to
radically upgrade their product quality.  It also forced them to develop a broad spectrum of
capabilities required for manufacturing as well as product design.  In the process of
qualifying as an IBM supplier, countless Taiwanese firms learned how to improve their
input procurement and production control methods in order to cut costs, improve quality and
to speed-up product development cycles and delivery.  IBM engineers regularly visited
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Taiwanese suppliers, screened their production facilities and logistics and assisted them to
improve their overall efficiency.  These visits included countless missions by IBM engineers
sent from the US or other affiliates of IBM’s global production network.80
Being an IBM supplier has been a great asset to many Taiwanese firms: buyers feel that they
can trust a supplier who has been able to cope with the stringent IBM procurement
requirements.  Going through an IBM apprenticeship thus has helped Taiwanese firms to
overcome their negative image of unreliability and shoddy quality.  It has helped them to
win more orders from other foreign computer companies.
Over the years, IBM has considerably expanded its OEM purchases from Taiwanese
sources, especially for monitors, motherboards, power supplies, mouse devices and laptop
computers; other American computer manufacturers followed suit.  IBM now procures
around $500 million annually from Taiwanese computer companies.81  Nonetheless, Taiwan
had to wait until the early 1980s before it was able to establish itself as a credible supplier.
Through the 1970s, Japanese firms continued to control the higher-end of the international
OEM market, and Korean chaebol occupied the lower-end market segments.  Two external
developments served to change this situation.82
The first occurred in 1982 when the Taiwanese government responded to American pressure
and declared the cloning of Apple II computers and video games illegal.  With the benefit of
hindsight it is obvious that this move actually accelerated the move of Taiwanese firms to
clone IBM PCs, which remained legal.  These developments coincided with dramatic
changes in the computer industry that created a window of opportunity for low-cost
producers.83  In contrast to mainframe and mini-computers, PC design is based on standard
microprocessors and operating systems.  As a result, computers became mass-produced,
standardized products (commodities).  Barriers to entry to final assembly are low and the
key to success for any “cloning” strategy thus lies beyond manufacturing.  A critical factor is
time-to-market: the PC vendor thus needs guaranteed access to reasonably priced key
components and the most up-to-date operating system; and its supply base for motherboards
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and other components must be able to respond fast and flexibly.  Coping with the first
prerequisite required close links with Intel and Microsoft, but the second was perfectly
matched to Taiwan’s domestic supplier structure.
A second external factor facilitated Taiwan´s entry into the international OEM business.  In
1987, the US government imposed punitive tariffs of 100 percent on Japanese PCs, both in
response to US-Japanese trade conflicts in semiconductors and as a reaction to a perceived
violation of COCOM rules by Toshiba.84  The punitive tariff on Japanese suppliers allowed
the Taiwanese to demonstrate to American computer companies that they could replace the
Japanese suppliers with good products at good prices, and that they could even deliver more
quickly.  Although the tariff was removed one year later, it was by then too late for Japanese
computer companies to recover their lost share in the rapidly moving OEM market.
Taiwan´s subsequent involvement in the OEM business has gone through different stages.
Each of these stages displayed a peculiar pattern of knowledge creation. It started with very
simple OEM arrangements.  The focus was on low-end desktop PCs and labor-intensive
peripherals, like computer mouse and keyboards.  The OEM customer provided detailed
technical "blueprints" and technical assistance to allow the Taiwanese contractor to produce
according to specifications.
There is a broad consensus that Taiwanese firms were able to reap substantial benefits from
this easy phase of OEM.  For example, in a late 1980s survey of 43 Taiwanese OEM
suppliers (27 domestic and 16 foreign invested), roughly 70 percent acknowledged that
OEM contracts were useful in transferring production technologies and in acquiring product
design capabilities.85  Yet, these simple forms of OEM also had substantial drawbacks.
Suppliers became “locked into” OEM relationships that hindered independent brand name
recognition and marketing channels.  Profit margins are thinner in OEM sales than in own
brand sales, which in turn makes it difficult for suppliers to muster the capital needed to
invest in R&D required for the development of new products.
In response to these draw-backs, a number of Taiwanese computer companies tried to
expand their share of own brand-name manufacturing (OBM) sales.  In 1988, for example,
the share of Taiwan brand-name to total PC sales stood at roughly 28 percent; by 1989 it had
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risen to 40 percent.86  Yet, the transition to OBM turned out to be difficult, and only a
handful of companies were able to succeed; most others failed and are now content to
consolidate and upgrade their position as OEM suppliers.  The story of this upgrading
process can be seen through the lens of Taiwan’s best-known computer company, Acer.
Acer's involvement in the PC cloning business dates back to 1983, when it was among the
first Taiwanese companies to introduce an IBM XT/PC compatible.  In the same year, Acer
had organized Taiwan's first International Distributor's Meeting, attended by delegates from
over 20 countries.  Building strong links with foreign distributors and OEM customers
subsequently became an important priority, complementing Acer's strong domestic roots.
The years following 1986 brought a number of early successes.  32 bit MPUs were just
beginning to appear on the market, and Acer was able to beat IBM in announcing a 32-bit
PC based on Intel's 386 MPU.  During the same year, Acer's subsidiary Continental
Systems, Inc. (now Acer Peripherals) received two successive Excellence Rewards from
ITT, acknowledging the high quality of its OEM products.  After changing the company
name to Acer in 1987,87 the company got approval to list on the Taiwan stock exchange in
1988.
Acer’s export success was wholly dependent on OEM sales, however.  These early triumphs
led Acer’s management to believe it could reduce this dependence and jump to producing its
own brands.  In 1988, Acer hired a senior IBM executive to reorganize the company with the
explicit goal to transform it into a global competitor.  Expectations were running high.  IBM
was still considered the industry's role model; by copying key features of IBM, Acer
expected to speed up its leap-frogging effort.  In particular, the idea was to increase the
company's vertical integration and generate a critical mass of proprietary assets that would
enable Acer to develop its own brand name image.
This effort failed miserably.  The IBM manager assumed that change could be imposed from
above by forcing consensus on the local management.  Such an aggressive top-down
approach ran into stubborn opposition by Acer's managers and engineers, who were used to
a substantial amount of decision autonomy. Furthermore, Acer simply did not have the
resources that are necessary to implement such a strategy.
The peak of leapfrogging euphoria came in 1989, when Acer shipped its one millionth
computer, was ranked for the first time by DATAMATION among the top 100 IT
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companies in the world, was chosen as one of the “corporate stars of the future” by the Wall
Street Journal; and was chosen by Texas Instruments as its joint venture partner for DRAM
production in Taiwan.  Insiders knew that TI's decision was based on the lavish financial
package that Acer, in cooperation with the Taiwanese government, was able to offer.88  For
a broader public, however, the tie up with T.I. conferred tremendous prestige.89
The shift in strategy was supposed to occur quickly.  Acer projected that the share of OEM
sales would decline from 40 percent of total sales in 1988 to 25 percent in 1992.  Not only
did Acer intend to compete through its own brand, but it also wanted to broaden its product
portfolio.  This led to a rapid succession of acquisitions which almost ended in disaster.
Acer acquired Counterpoint Computers with the intention of using it to build a strong
position in minicomputers, but the follow-up costs of technology development and
marketing were way above Acer's expectations.  Counterpoint lost $15 million in 1989
alone, almost as much as the $17 million that Acer had paid for the firm, and the firm was
closed down.  Undeterred, Acer tried again the following year, by acquiring Altos, an
American producer of UNIX-based multi-user systems.  At the time, the expectation was
that Altos' UNIX experience and distribution channels would help Acer to speed up its
product diversification.90  Bought for $94 million, the firm recorded a mere $125 million in
sales in 1990, and was incurring heavy losses.  Such losses continued for a few more years,
but this time, Acer also benefited.  By acquiring Altos, the company was able to develop its
computer networking capabilities and to enter the PC server market.91
The awakening came in 1991 when Acer posted a loss ($23 million) for the first time.
Acer's over-ambitious diversification strategy came at the worst possible moment.  The PC
industry worldwide was swept by a crippling price war, as a result of which almost all
companies faced a serious profit squeeze.
Taiwan's computer industry was particularly hard hit and went through a major shake-out.
During the second half of 1991, 50 to 60 Taiwanese computer companies went out of
business each month.92  Most of these firms were small companies.  One could argue that
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this was a healthy development, as it indicated a long overdue consolidation of this industry.
Moreover, the disappearance of small firms from a sector under pressure seems to be a fairly
normal occurrence in Taiwan; many of them reappear making something else or at a foreign
location.  Since 1991, however, a number of larger Taiwanese PC companies like Acer were
in serious trouble too; some, such as Autocomputer, actually went out of business.
The spread of intense price wars constituted a major challenge for the Taiwanese computer
industry, and readjustment came at a heavy cost.  The big players pursued aggressive price-
cutting strategies, with the result that cost reduction became the most critical issue in the
computer industry.  This posed a serious challenge for Taiwanese firms.  In order to sustain
their position as OEM suppliers, they had to implement drastic additional cost reductions at
a time when Taiwan's traditional cost advantages were rapidly eroding.  Fueled by the
appreciation of the NT$, the cost of land and labor in Taiwan exploded in the early 1990s,
with the result that Taiwan lost its comparative advantage as a low-cost production site.  At
the same time, Taiwan faced serious competitive threats both from below and from above.
New low-cost competitors have entered the fray in Southeast Asia and China, while South
Korea has strengthened its position as a supplier of scale-intensive components, like
DRAMs, monitors, CRT picture tubes and display devices. Furthermore, Japanese firms,
which have lost market share both at home and in export markets, have now started to fight
back and to develop much more aggressive global market penetration strategies.
As a result, Taiwan´s OBM products came under fierce attack.  The OBM share of Taiwan´s
PC exports fell from 30 percent in 1992 to 22 percent in 1993.93  Taiwan´s computer
industry thus did not have much choice but to fall back on its strength as OEM suppliers:
most firms made a conscious effort to consolidate their position in this field.94
Acer pursued a different approach.  While it consolidated its position as an OEM supplier, it
simultaneously continued to pursue an aggressive OBM strategy.  Rather than trying to
reduce its reliance on OEM contracts, the objective now is to quickly increase the OEM
share to 50 percent.  This part of the strategy has worked well.  For desktop computers, Acer
is one of the five Taiwan-based producers that have collectively come to dominate the OEM
market: Tatung, Acer, DEC's Taiwan affiliate, FIC and AST's local affiliate.  In addition to
its strong position in desktop PCs, Acer has also become a major OEM supplier of notebook
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computers for Apple and Canon.  The result has been that, in 1994, the OEM share of Acer's
PC sales had risen again to 35 percent.
Acer’s strategy is to leverage its OEM business to generate the necessary financial resources
to pursue its OBM strategy and to further upgrade Acer´s capabilities, especially in design
and computer networking.  The logical consequence is a focus on mass production rather
than on niche markets.  Acer´s goal is to become one of the world´s highest-volume
producers of peripheral equipment, key components, sub-assemblies and design services,
both for Acer's worldwide computer assembly plants and for leading international computer
companies like Apple, Canon and Fujitsu.  Acer describes its own competitive strength as
“...the ability to market affordably-priced products quickly due to innovative production and
distribution strategies, a component supply approach, a flexible and independent
organization and economies of scale in manufacturing.”95
Meanwhile, Acer´s OBM strategy tries to combine the following, not always consistent
goals: to establish a credible global brand image for a broad mix of "affordably-priced
products"; to improve its ability to market such products quickly and to adapt them in
response to changing market requirements; to penetrate secondary markets in Asia, Latin
America, and elsewhere in order to gain economies of scale and to use these countries as a
test-ground for refining its globalization strategy.  In these markets, Acer aims to price its
products 10 to 15 percent below Compaq's prices.  Gradually, Acer would build its product
and marketing capabilities in a few very limited "market niches".  Acer's acquisition of some
American computer companies, like Altos, was one element of this approach, but much
more important is the shift to digital consumer electronics, and possibly, Acer's pioneering
role in the field of software design and distribution.  These objectives serve the over-riding
concern of developing an independent global brand image.
Until 1995, this dual strategy worked reasonably well: between 1993 and 1995, Acer's share
price has almost quintupled.96  And in 1995, the group’s consolidated sales revenues were
$5.8 billion, up from $690 million in 1989.  This quick and impressive turn-around owes a
great deal to sheer luck, and to industry-specific factors that were beyond Acer's control.
Probably of greatest importance has been the strong demand for DRAM chips which has
pushed up profit margins for this product. Without the windfall profits of TI-Acer's DRAM
joint venture, Acer would probably still suffer from its over-ambitious diversification
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strategy.  In 1993, 90 percent of Acer's net earnings were generated by TI-Acer, and its share
in Acer's 1995 net earnings was still as high as 45 percent.  This however has drastically
changed since 1996.  As a result of the free fall of DRAM prices, TI-Acer has ceased to act
as a cash cow for Acer´s OBM strategy.
As for Acer's core PC business, profit margins have improved.  The surprise success of
Acer's multi-media home personal computer in 1994 has helped to improve the company’s
position.97  In 1995, Acer became one of the top ten PC suppliers to the US market.  Since
then however not much has moved.  In 1995, the US market still accounted for roughly 26
percent of Acer's worldwide sales, and in 1996 Acer America went into the red again.98
While Acer retained its top position in a number of rapidly growing, yet still quite secondary
markets like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa, the overall growth of sales
revenues for computers has slowed down and Acer has still not succeeded to expand its
OBM market share in Japan and China.  Margins in the computer business are also low—4
percent—and as a result, Acer´s 1996 net profits were substantially lower than Acer´s own
forecast.  These results are simply too meager to support Acer’s ambitious upgrading
strategy.99
All of this does not imply that Acer´s strategy has failed altogether.  Rarely has a company
grown so fast, and rarely has a small firm from a small nation been able to build up such a
broad range of capabilities and to introduce far-reaching organizational innovations during a
relatively short period of time.  Yet, it also shows that there is no easy and quick short-cut to
success and that leap-frogging is an illusionary concept that should be discarded100.
Developing a firm’s knowledge base is a time-consuming and laborious process:  at each
stage of its growth, new barriers arise that require a period of consolidation. The more Acer
progresses and grows, the more demanding will be the barriers with which it has to cope.
This excludes a frontal attack on the market leaders. Attacking from the sidelines is the only
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realistic option. This is certainly true as long as Acer has not yet reached a size that qualifies
it for Fortune 500 membership. The key to Acer´s success is that it has pursued a gradual
market penetration strategy: it avoids direct confrontation and pursues markets where the
market leaders are not present101. Acer´s OBM strategy thus remains primarily focused on
non-OECD markets, while at the same time it continues to upgrade its capabilities as an
OEM supplier. This shows that Chandler is right in emphasizing the difficulties to overcome
the first mover advantages of large multinationals
102
. Yet, Acer´s story also shows that a
small firm from a small nation can enter and grow in the rapidly moving computer industry,
provided that it pursues a realstic market penetration strategy.
Developing a global brand image is costly and involves extreme risks. Acer´s approach to
“attack from the sidelines” and to focus its OBM strategy on non-OECD markets is one
realistic response to this dilemma. As for market penetration in the US, Japan and Europe,
Taiwanese computer firms will have to rely however for quite some time on OEM contracts.
This is why upgrading Taiwan´s OEM position is currently the appropriate strategic priority.
Let us look at some examples.
During 1993, Taiwan became the main OEM supplier of PC-related products for leading
American and European computer manufacturers and distributors. Compaq for instance now
sources its monitors from ADI, Philips Taiwan and TECO; notebooks from Inventa, power
supplies from Lite-on and Delta, and mouse devices from Logitech Taiwan and Primax.
Probably the most interesting arrangement is that with Inventa, a company that has earned a
reputation for innovative notebook design and that has already supplied notebooks on an
ODM basis to Dell and Zenith, now an affiliate of the French computer firm Bull.  Inventa is
part of the family-owned Inventec business group that is involved in a wide range of
products and services, but is most well-known for calculators and telephones.  In 1994, the
group’s consolidated revenues were $450 million, with Inventa contributing more than one
third.  Inventa has only a few hundred employees in Taiwan, with a large share of engineers.
As part of the Inventec group however, Inventa has access to low-cost volume production
facilities that the group has established in China and Southeast Asia, primarily Malaysia.  A
second attraction of such networks are the sophisticated quality control procedures
characteristic of Inventec´s manufacturing facilities.  For the last 15 years, Inventec has
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made Texas Instrument’s calculators and had to cope with TI´s stringent quality
requirements.  But probably the most important reason for Compaq to link up with Inventa
are the company’s specialized design capabilities for notebook computers.103  In 1994,
Compaq was only fourth in the notebook market behind IBM, NEC and Toshiba.  By using
Inventa´s notebook design, Compaq expected to be able to leapfrog the market leaders,
without being forced to commit its own limited engineering resources.
Logitech Taiwan provides another illustration of how complex international production
networks have become in the computer industry; it also highlights the high volatility of the
OEM business and the need to continuously upgrade product mix and capabilities104.
Founded in 1981 in Switzerland and incorporated a few months later in the US, Logitech is
the world’s largest producer of computer tracking devices (mice and trackballs).  In 1987,
Logitech shifted production to Taiwan and established a large volume production line in
Hsinchu Science Park.  Taiwan´s main attraction was that it offered a well-developed supply
base for parts, qualified people, and a rapidly expanding PC industry.  In 1995, however,
Logitech shifted all of its production from Taiwan to China.  The result has been a drastic
decline of Taiwan´s share of the global mouse market from almost 75 percent in 1994 to 65
percent in 1996. At the same time, Logitech continues to use the same Taiwanese suppliers
that have now set up shop close to Logitech`s new location in China.
Over time, Compaq’s OEM arrangements with Taiwanese firms have considerably increased
in complexity.  In a recent “turnkey production” contract with Mitac, Compaq has out-
sourced all stages of the value chain for some of its desktop PCs, except marketing for
which it retains sole responsibility.  Other foreign computer companies have followed
Compaq’s example.  For instance, IBM has recently signed a preliminary agreement with the
Acer Group where Acer will use its international production network in developing
countries to assemble lower-end IBM desktop and laptop PCs and to distribute and service
them.  Such “turnkey production” arrangements constitute an important innovation, and
show how rapidly OEM relationships have moved beyond production to encompass an
increasing variety of high-end support services.  The spread of such broad cross-value chain
arrangements shows that leading foreign computer companies are confident that Taiwan´s
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computer industry is now sufficiently well integrated to serve as a one-stop shopping
center.105
Japanese PC manufacturers have also drastically increased their OEM contracts with
Taiwanese firms for desktop PCs, motherboards, terminals and monitors, and a variety of
other PC-related products.  NEC for instance gets monitors and motherboards from Tatung
and Elite, Fujitsu has relied primarily on OEM supplies from Acer, and Epson, Canon,
Hitachi, Sharp and Mitsubishi have all become major OEM customers.  In 1994, this was
followed by a massive increase of OEM contracts for notebook computers.
As a result of these developments, the share of OEM/ODM out of Taiwan’s total desktop
PC production has increased, in volume terms, from 37 percent in 1995 to 53 percent in
1996. For notebook PCs, the share of OEM/ODM reached 82 percent in 1996.
For two reasons, these developments benefit rather than harm Taiwan´s computer industry.
First, Taiwan´s OEM clients now include the top ten worldwide industry leaders which are
at the cutting-edge of product development.  Close interaction with these industry leaders
provides Taiwanese firms with a constant flow of precious feedback information on product
design, new architectural standards, leading-edge production technology, and sophisticated
quality control and logistics procedures.  Close links with these industry leaders acts as a
powerful vehicle for a further strengthening of the learning and innovation capabilities of
Taiwanese computer firms.
At the same time, we have seen that OEM contracts have now become much more
demanding: they require a broad range of sophisticated capabilities that cover most if not all
stages of the value chain.  Taiwanese firms now need to provide more sophisticated services,
including design and global supply chain management.106  While in 1993, roughly one half
of all PCs supplied by Taiwanese OEM suppliers were based on Taiwanese designs, this
share today has increased to more than 70 percent.107
Of even greater importance is a tendency to extend OEM contracts to comprise an integrated
package of higher-end support services, as illustrated in the “turnkey production” contracts
of Compaq with Mitac, and of IBM with Acer.  This implies that, with the exception of
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hardcore R&D and strategic marketing, Taiwan’s OEM supplier community must be able to
shoulder all steps in the production chain and the coordination functions necessary for
global supply chain management.
Changing OEM relationships are producing a new division of labor between large
Taiwanese computer majors and SMEs.  Large firms appear to rely more on OEM contracts,
while SMEs are much more active in ODM.  For instance, OEM orders for desktop
computers are all concentrated on a select group of large companies, i.e. Tatung, Acer, DEC
Taiwan, FIC and MITAC.  The same is true for other scale-sensitive products such as
monitors and modems.  This sounds counter-intuitive, but OEM contracts come in large
orders; they typically generate razor-thin profit margins.  Economies of scale and scope are
of critical  importance, and large firms are better placed to reap such economies.  Time and
again, we thus find that Chandler’s insistence on the continuous importance of scale and
scope economies makes perfect sense, even in a fast moving sector like the computer
industry.108  Moreover, only a large firm can avoid becoming overly dependent on one
particular customer.  Smaller firms may find it too risky to depend on large OEM contracts,
as each of these contracts normally surpasses their maximum production capacity.  They
prefer to shift to ODM contracts where they have greater chances to sustain a diversified
customer base and charge higher prices.  In other words, SMEs are under greater pressure
relative to large Taiwanese firms to improve their design capabilities to become credible
niche market players within the overall OEM market.  Many of these SMEs will not
succeed, but those that do have good chances to grow and to improve their competitive
position.
Conclusion
This study shows beyond doubt how knowledge creation in small firms can benefit from
participating in international production networks; however, those benefits do not come
automatically.  Reaping them requires far-reaching institutional and organizational
innovations that enable small firms from a small nation to overcome their size-related
disadvantages.  Taiwan´s industrial development policies have played an important role, as
did close interaction with large domestic and foreign firms. A continuous upgrading of firm
organization and participation in international production networks have both played a
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critical role for inter-organizational knowledge creation.
The great advantage of Taiwan´s computer industry has been the incredible speed with
which it has been able to respond to changes in markets and technology. Such quick
response and flexibility now needs to be supplemented with industrial deepening the
development of a domestic supply base for key components and improved product
differentiation capabilities. The rapid expansion of production capacity and international
market share for PC-related products has not been fully matched by industrial deepening.
For most of the key components that determine the price and the performance features of its
major export products, Taiwan continues to rely heavily on imports, primarily from Japan.
CRTs for computer monitors provide an example: nearly two thirds have to be imported,
either from Japan or from Japanese affiliates in Southeast Asia.  The situation is equally
severe for display panels, a key component for Taiwan´s thriving portable PC industry.
Taiwan has to import virtually all of the high-end flat panel displays that are used in its
portable PCs, and the supply of these devices is controlled by a tightly knit oligopoly
consisting of Sharp, a Toshiba-IBM joint venture and NEC, with Hitachi and Matsushita
being important second-tier producers.  This heavy dependence on component imports from
Japan has been the root cause for Taiwan´s exploding electronics trade deficit with Japan.
In 1993, Taiwan´s trade deficit in components ($2.5 billion) was responsible for almost 72
percent of Taiwan´s total electronics trade deficit with Japan.109
Obviously, this is a crucial challenge for Taiwan´s electronics industry: it requires a further
upgrading of Taiwan´s knowledge creation management. Apart from strengthening their
domestic R&D capabilities, Taiwanese firms also need to locate R&D labs as listening posts
abroad in the relevant centers of excellence in the US, Japan and Europe.  To do this
requires a variety of joint ventures and strategic alliances with major international
electronics firms.  Simultaneously, a concerted effort is required to move beyond an
exclusive focus on hardware production and to complement this with attempts to strengthen
domestic capabilities in information services industries.
All of this will require time.  What matters is that Taiwan has succeeded to developing a
critical mass of knowledge and capabilities that will help this small island economy to cope
with future challenges.  The Taiwanese model in the computer industry provides clear
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evidence that David can defeat Goliath, and that small enterprises can succeed in global
competition.
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